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Submitting Theories of
Respondeat Superior and
Negligent Entrustment/Hiring*
McHaffie v. Bunch1
I. INTRODUCTION
An employer who entrusts, hires or retains an incompetent employee to
operate a motor vehicle is liable for any resulting damages.2 Liability does
not arise out of the employment relationship, nor does it rest on vicarious
liability. It is an independent tort resting on the combined negligence of the
employer and the employee?
Establishing liability under negligent entrustment/hiring requires evidence
indicating that the employer was aware of the employee's incompetence.4
Evidence of prior incidents of employee incompetence, normally inadmissible
as prior bad acts, is allowed to go to the jury. Such inflammatory evidence
may prejudice the defendant employer if the employer already admitted
liability for the employee's misconduct under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.
In McHaffie v. Bunch, the Missouri Supreme Court considered this
evidentiary problem and concluded that evidence associated with the claims
of negligent entrustment/hiring must be excluded when defendant employers
stipulate to liability under respondeat superior.5 This Note considers the
appropriateness of this holding.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In February of 1989, Laura McHaffie was seriously injured in an
automobile accident on Interstate Highway 44 in Greene County, Missouri.6
McHaffie was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Cindy D. Bunch when the

* The author recognizes the late Honorable Judge Elwood Thomas for his support
and assistance in preparing this Note.

1. 891 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. 1995).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

See 7A AM. JUR. 2D Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 644 (1980).
See 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 334 (1989).
See 7A AM. JUR. 2D Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 643 (1980).
McHaffie, 891 S.W.2d at 825.
Id. at 824.
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vehicle left the highway, crossed the median and collided with a tractortrailer Donald R. Farmer, an employee of Rumble Transport ("Rumble"),
was the operator of the tractor-trailer.8 Bruce Transport and Leasing
("Bruce") owned the truck and leased the vehicle to Rumble.'
In the Circuit Court of Greene County, McHaffie alleged that Bunch had
negligently failed to drive on the correct side of the road and further claimed
that Farmer, the tractor-trailer operator, failed to keep a careful lookout. °
Under the doctrine of respondeatsuperior,McHaffie sought to hold Bruce and
Rumble vicariously liable for Farmer's negligence." Bruce and Rumble
conceded that Farmer was their employee acting in the course and scope of
employment. 2 In a separate count, however, McHaffie sought damages from
Rumble for negligently hiring and supervising Farmer. 3
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury totaled McHaffie's damages at
$5,258,000.'" The court divided and assessed fault as follows: 70% to
Bunch, 10% to Bruce and Rumble for Farmer's negligence based upon
respondeatsuperior,an additional 10% to Rumble based on negligent hiring
and 10% to McHaffie based on her negligence for riding with an intoxicated
driver. 5 Fanner, Bruce and Rumble appealed the lower court's decision
arguing the appropriateness of McHaffie's negligent hiring claim after Bruce
and Rumble conceded to liability for Farmer's negligence under the doctrine
of respondeat superior.'6 The Southern District Court of Appeals agreed
with the Appellants and ordered a new trial on all the issues. 7 The Missouri
Supreme Court granted transfer to reconsider the Appellants' arguments.' 8
The court considered whether respondeatsuperior and negligent hiring claims

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.McHaffie "introduced evidence that Rumble did not require Farmer to
have adequate experience, testing, training and medical evaluations before driving their
trucks." Further evidence indicated that Rumble "did not adequately enforce
regulations requiring Farmer to maintain log books." Nothing in the pleadings or
evidence, however, suggested that Rumble's lack of care in hiring and supervising led
to McHaffie's injuries. Id.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
at 825.
Id.
Id.
Id.
at 824.
Id.; see Mo. R. CIV. P. 83.03.
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are consistent and may be submitted together. 9 The Missouri Supreme
Court affirmed the court of appeals decision in part and reversed and
remanded in part.2 ° The court found reversible error for allowing the
negligent hiring claim against Rumble and admitting evidence on that theory
after Bruce and Rumble conceded to liability under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.21
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Theories of Employer Vicarious Liability
There are three predominant theories in Missouri under which an
employer is held vicariously liable for the negligence of an employee.'
These theories are respondeatsuperior, negligent entrustment and negligent
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is
hiring.'
responsible for "the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope
of employment."2 4 Missouri courts recognize this cause of action."

19. McHaffie, 891 S.W.2d at 825.
20. Id.at 824.
21. Id.at 827.
22. Ransom v. Adams Dairy Co., 684 S.W.2d 915, 920 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
Derivative or vicarious liability suggests imposing culpability on the actor for the

conduct of a third party.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1566 (6th ed. 1990).

23. Ransom, 684 S.W.2d at 920. In Ransom, the court did not restrict the
plaintiff to these theories but noted the dependency of these claims on the negligence
of the employee. Id.
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1957). The Restatement
specifies that the employer does not have to violate a duty or authorize the negligent

conduct to be liable under this doctrine.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 216

(1957). The rationale of the liability derives from the idea that an employer "controls"
the physical activities of an employee during and within the terms of employment.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 219 cmt. a (1957). The concept grew out of

early common law governing master-servant relationships. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY, Title B. Torts of Servants, Introductory Note, Historical Note (1957).
25. See Burks v. Leap, 413 S.W.2d 258, 266 (Mo. 1967); Leidy v. Taliaferro, 260
S.W.2d 504 (Mo. 1953); Porter v. Thompson, 206 S.W.2d 509 (Mo. 1947); Stumpf
v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. 189 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. 1945); Bass v. Kansas City
Journal Post Co., 148 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1941); Clark v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 724
S.W.2d 90 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Wagstaff v. City of Maplewood, 615 S.W.2d 608

(Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (quoting the

RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY);

Smoot v. Marks, 564

S.W.2d 231 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Presley v. Central Terminal Co., 142 S.W.2d 799
(Mo. Ct. App. 1940); Daniel v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 73 S.W.2d 355 (Mo. Ct. App.
1934).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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No single test exists in Missouri to determine an employer's liability
under respondeatsuperior,and courts base their determination of liability on
the specific facts of each case.26 Generally, however, upon establishing a
principal/agent relationship, an employer is liable for an employee's conduct
occurring within the scope and course of employment.27 Historically, an
employee was acting within the scope of employment if the employer had the
right to control the physical conduct of the employee.28 More recently,
however, courts find an employee acting within the scope of employment if
the conduct is committed by virtue of the employment and in furtherance of
the employer's business or interest.29
Under the doctrine of negligent entrustment, an employer is liable for the
misconduct of an employee if the employer knows or should know that the
employee is likely "to conduct himself in such a manner as to create an
unreasonable risk of harm to others."3 Missouri courts recognize a similar
cause of action. 3 In Missouri, the doctrine requires evidence that 1) the

26. Gardner v. Simmons, 370 S.W.2d 359, 361 (Mo. 1963); Wilson v. St. Louis
Area Council, Boy Scouts of America, 845 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
27. Strickland v. Taco Bell Corp., 849 S.W.2d 127, 132-33 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
28. See Smith v. Fine, 175 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Mo. 1944); Mattan v. Hoover Co.,
166 S.W.2d 557, 564 (Mo. 1943); Corder v. Morgan Roofing Co., 166 S.W.2d 455,
457 (Mo. 1943).
29. Burks, 413 S.W.2d at 266-67. The Supreme Court of Missouri found an
employee within the "scope of his employment" even though the employee was not
engaged in an activity which he was hired to do. Id. The employee, a gold
technician, was asked by another employee to make a delivery, and the court
concluded that the delivery occurred by virtue of employment and in furtherance of
the employer's business and was within the "scope of employment." Id.
Noah v. Ziehl, 759 S.W.2d 905, 910 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). The Missouri
appellate court found that the "scope and course" of employment of a bouncer at a
drinking establishment did not include the physical attack of a paying customer. The
court held that the actions of an enraged jealous employee could not possibly be
construed as furthering the "interests" of his employer. See also Brickner v. Normandy
Osteopathic Hosp. Inc., 746 S.W.2d 108, 115 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the
plaintiff did not have to show that the employer had actual control over the employee).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 308 (1965). The Restatement indicates

that such negligence is not derivative of the misconduct of the employee but exists
independently of the employee's negligence. The theory derives from the principle
that the entrustee is entitled to use or possess the chattel under the consent or approval
of the entrustor. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 308 cmt. a (1965).
31. See Evans v. Allen Auto Rental and Truck Leasing, Inc., 555 S.W.2d 325,
326 (Mo. 1977) (en banc); Blankenship v. St. Joseph Fuel Oil & Mfg. Co., 232
S.W.2d 954, 958 (Mo. 1954); Ransom v. Adams Dairy Co., 684 S.W.2d 915, 920
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Sampson v. W. F. Enterprises, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 333, 338 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1980).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss1/11
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entrustee is incompetent because of age, experience, habitual recklessness or
otherwise; 2) the entrustor knew or should have known of the entrustee's
incompetence; 3) the chattel was entrusted to the entrustee; and 4) the
entrustor's negligence concurred with the misconduct of the entrustee as a
proximate cause of the harm to the plaintiff.3 2 The employer's liability,
therefore, is derivative or dependent on the employee's misconduct.33 The
employer's negligence, however, is independent of the employee's misconduct
and the employer's liability under respondeatsuperior.34
Under the doctrine of negligent hiring or retention, an employer is liable
for the harm resulting from an employee's actions if the employer negligently
or recklessly employs or retains an "improper person" for "work involving risk
of harm to others."35

Automobile entrustment cases include: Bell v. Green, 423 S.W.2d 724, 729-30
(Mo. 1968); Wood v. Hudson, 823 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Thomasson
v. Winsett, 310 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958); Ritchie v. Burton, 292 S.W.2d 599,
606-07 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956); Lix v. Gastian, 261 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Mo. Ct. App.
1953); Saunders v. Prue, 151 S.W.2d 478 (Mo. Ct. App. 1941).
32. Evans, 555 S.W.2d at 326. Evans was an automobile entrustment case which
questioned the verdict directing jury instruction for this theory. Id. This test was
reaffirmed. See Ransom, 684 S.W.2d at 920 n.5; Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Politte, 663
S.W.2d 777, 778 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
33. Evans, 555 S.W.2d at 326. Because the employer's negligence in entrusting
the chattel must concur with the employee's misconduct, it is dependent on this
misconduct. For this reason, the action is similar to a respondeatsuperiorclaim as
liability is derived from the employee's negligence. See supra notes 24-29.
34. Bruck v. Jim Walter Corp., 470 So. 2d 1141, 1143 (Ala. 1985) (citing 7A
AM. JUR. 2D Automobiles andHighwayTraffic § 643 (1980)). The Supreme Court of
Alabama separated the employer's liability created by entrusting a vehicle to an
incompetent employee from the negligence of the employee driver. Id. at 1143. The
plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against the driver and owner of a tractor-

trailer. Id. at 1142. The plaintiff pled separate claims of negligent entrustment and
respondeat superior, and the defendant alleged that this was improper. Id. The
Alabama court held that negligent entrustment predicates the employer's own
negligence and is "separate and distinct" from a claim based upon the doctrine of
respondeatsuperior. Id.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1957). An actor is liable for the
actions of a third party if the actor knows or should know that the person is "peculiarly
likely to commit intentionalmisconduct." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B
cmt. e(D) (1965) (emphasis added). This view was adopted by the St. Louis District
Court of Appeals in a case involving an action against a school for the alleged physical
and mental abuse of a student by a teacher. Butler v. Circulus, Inc., 557 S.W.2d 469,

475 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
The theory is not based on the master/servant relationship. Liability exists only
if the employer fulfills all the elements of an action for negligence without considering
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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Missouri recognizes this cause of action.36 Under Missouri common
law, employer liability depends on the existence of facts indicating that the
employer "knew or should have known of the employee's dangerous
proclivity" and a determination that the employer's negligence proximately
caused the plaintiff's injury.37 Missouri case law does not require that the
offending conduct occur within the course and scope of employment,38 but
implicit in this cause of action, is the existence of an employer-employee
relationship. 39 Furthermore, Missouri courts seem to require intentional or
criminal employee misconduct."
Finally, like the tort of negligent
entrustment, the employer's liability under negligent hiring or retention is
derivative or dependent on the employee's misconduct.4 The employer's

the actions of the employee. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 cmt. a
(1957).
36. Strauss v. Hotel Continental Co., 610 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
See also Porter v. Thompson 206 S.W.2d 509, 512 (Mo. 1947); Smothers v. Welch
& Co. House Furnishing Co., 274 S.W. 678, 679 (Mo. 1925); J. H. Cosgrove
Contractors, Inc. v. Kaster, 851 S.W.2d 794, 798 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Stubbs v.
Panek, 829 S.W.2d 544, 548 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Butler v. Hurlbut, 826 S.W.2d 90,
92 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Ransom v. Adams Dairy Co., 684 S.W.2d 915, 920 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1985); Gaines v. Monsanto Co., 655 S.W.2d 568, 571-72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983);
Priest v. F. W. Woolworth Five & Ten Cent Store, 62 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Mo. Ct. App.
1933).
37. Gaines, 655 S.W.2d at 570. See also J. H. Cosgrove Contractors, 851
S.W.2d at 798; Stubbs, 829 S.W.2d at 548; Butler, 826 S.W.2d at 92.
38. Smothers, 274 S.W. at 679. The court found that the plaintiff could not
recover from the defendant employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior
because the alleged rape by the employee had not occurred within the scope of
employment, but the court noted that the employer's duty "doubtless includes the duty
of using ordinary care to employ competent and law-abiding servants." Id. See also
supra note 35.
39. J. H. Cosgrove Contractors,851 S.W.2d at 798.
40. Porter,206 S.W.2d at 512 (alleging that defendant's employee attempted to
shoot plaintiff); J. H. Cosgrove Contractors, 851 S.W.2d at 797 (alleging that
defendant's employee fraudulently induced plaintiff to obtain loan); Stubbs, 829
S.W.2d at 546 (alleging that defendant's employee abducted and murdered plaintiff's
child); Butler, 826 S.W.2d at 92 (alleging that defendant's employee murdered
plaintiff's son); Gaines, 655 S.W.2d at 569 (alleging that defendant's employee
murdered plaintiff's daughter); Strauss, 610 S.W.2d at 110 (alleging that defendant's
employee assaulted plaintiff); Priest, 62 S.W.2d at 926 (alleging that defendant's
employee assaulted plaintiff).
41. The nature of the two torts suggests that there would be no liability on the
employer absent the employee's misconduct. See supranotes 32-33 and accompanying
text.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss1/11
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negligence, however, is independent of the liability imposed under the doctrine

of respondeatsuperior."
B. Pleading the Three Theories43
The independence of an employer's negligence in a negligent entrustment
case poses significant evidentiary conflicts. Ordinarily, evidence of prior
negligence, recklessness or intentional employee misconduct is inadmissible
In a negligent entrustment
in determining respondeat superior liability.'
claim, however, such evidence is relevant, material and admissible.45 If the
defendant employer admits that the employee was acting within the "scope and
course of employment" conceding respondeatsuperior liability but denies the
negligent entrustment claim, the question arises whether the evidence of prior
bad acts should be admissible to establish this independent act of
negligence.46

42. Gaines, 655 S.W.2d at 570. A wrongful death action was brought by the
parents of a murder victim against the defendant employer for negligently hiring and
retaining the employee convicted of the crime. Id. at 569. The Missouri appellate
court found that the defendant employer may be directly liable for the negligent
hiring/retention. Id. at 570. The claim would be dependent on the employee's
misconduct, but the negligence was independent and separable from the employee's
negligence and respondeatsuperiorliability. Id.
See also Butler v. Circulus, Inc., 557 S.W.2d 469, 472-76 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977)
(recognizing a negligent hiring/retention claim and a claim under respondeatsuperior).
43. See generally, Debra E. Wax, Annotation, Propriety of Allowing Person
Injured in Motor Vehicle Accident to ProceedAgainst Vehicle Owner Under Theory
of Negligent Entrustment Where Owner Admits Liability Under Another Theory of
Recovery, 30 A.L.R.4th 838 (1984).
Even though Missouri recognizes negligent hiring/retention and negligent
entrustment as separate and distinct theories, for simplicity, when the author uses
"negligent entrustment" that subsumes both theories.
44. Weaver v. Scofield, 198 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1947). See also
McJunkins v. Windham Power Lifts, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)
(noting that admitting evidence ofprior bad acts can be prejudicially erroneous because
it is collateral and may mislead or confuse the jury).
45. Negligent hiring requires facts which indicate that the employer knew or
should have known of an employee's prior bad acts. See supra note 37 and
accompanying text. Negligent entrustment requires that the plaintiff show that the
employer knew ofthe employee's incompetence. See supranote 32 and accompanying
text. Evidenced prior bad acts, therefore, are admitted under these theories to establish
these elements.
46. A negligent hiring theory of recovery is essentially indistinguishable from a
negligent entrustment theory of recovery for purposes of discussing the propriety of
joining respondeatsuperiorwith either of these two theories. McHaffie v. Bunch, No.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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The majority of jurisdictions prohibits the plaintiff from pursuing a
negligent entrustment claim once respondeat superior liability is
established.47 These jurisdictions reason that the employer, though possibly
guilty of a separate tort, is still only liable for the employee's negligence.48
According to these jurisdictions, the negligent entrustment action is abandoned
because the plaintiff cannot hope to recover anymore than what the defendant
already conceded to under respondeat superior.49 Collateral evidence
necessary to establish negligent entrustment, therefore, becomes unnecessary,
irrelevant and inflammatory. 0
A rare exception to this rule exists in comparative fault jurisdictions.5'
Under ordinary contributory fault principles, if the plaintiff establishes
defendant's negligence, the plaintiff may recover if the court does not find
Submitting negligent entrustment with a
contributory negligence. 2
respondeat superior claim adds nothing to the plaintiffs case.53 Under
comparative fault, however, a federal district court in Illinois noted:

18097, 1994 WL 72430 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar 10, 1994).
47. Wise v. Fiberglass Sys., Inc., 718 P.2d 1178, 1181 (Idaho 1986) (citing Elrod
v. G & R Constr. Co., 628 S.W.2d 17 (Ark. 1982)); Clooney v. Geeting, 352 So. 2d
1216, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Willis v. Hill, 159 S.E.2d 145 (Ga. Ct. App.
1967), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Hill v. Willis, 161 S.E.2d 281 (Ga. 1968);
Houlihan v. McCall, 78 A.2d 661, 665 (Md. 1951). See also Wax, Annotation, supra
note 43, at 838; 7A AM. JUR. 2D Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 693 (1980);
Armenta v. Churchill, 267 P.2d 303, 308-09 (Cal. 1954) (en banc); Prosser v.
Richman, 50 A.2d 85, 87 (Conn. 1946); Ledesma v. Cannonball, Inc., 538 N.E.2d 655,
661 (ill. App. Ct. 1989) supersededby statute as stated in Lorio v. Cartwright, 768 F.
Supp. 658 (N.D. I11.1991); Nehi Bottling Co. v. Jefferson, 84 So. 2d 684, 686 (Miss.
1956); Heath v. Kirkman, 82 S.E.2d 104, 107 (N.C. 1954); Patterson v. East Texas
Motor Freight Lines, 349 S.W.2d 634, 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Bowmanv. Norfolk
S. Ry. Co., 832 F. Supp. 1014, 1021-22 (D.S.C. 1993); Breeding v. Massey, 378 F.2d
171, 178 (8th Cir. 1967); Hood v. Dealers Transp. Co., 459 F. Supp. 684, 685 (N.D.
Miss. 1978); Hackett v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 736 F. Supp. 8, 9-11
(D.D.C. 1990); Tindall v. Enderle, 320 N.E.2d 764,767-68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974); Tuite
v. Union Pac. Stages, Inc., 284 P.2d 333, 338-39 (Or. 1955); Ortiz v. New Mexico
State Police, 814 P.2d 117, 120 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
48. Elrod, 628 S.W.2d at 19 (citing Kyser v. Porter, 548 S.W.2d 128 (Ark.
1977)).

49. Elrod,628 S.W.2d at 19.
50. Willis, 159 S.E.2d at 157.
51. Respondents' Substitute Brief at 14, McHaffie v. Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822, 827
(Mo. 1995) (citing Lorio v. Cartwright, 768 F. Supp. 658 (N.D. Ill. 1991) and Lim v.
Interstate Sys. Steel Div., Inc., 435 N.W.2d 830 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)).
52. Lorio, 768 F. Supp at 660.
53. Id; see supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss1/11
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If plaintiffs were to prevail on both the negligence claim against the
entrustee-agent and on the negligent entrustment claim against the entrustorprincipal, the entrustor-principal would be liable for the percentage of
plaintiff's damages caused by the entrustee-agent's negligence and for the
percentage of plaintiff's damages caused by the entrustor-principal's
separate negligence in entrusting the vehicle to the entrustee-agent. This
could make a great deal of difference in the amount ofjudgment. It would
not be possible for a finder of fact to make the necessary determination of
degrees of fault without having before it the evidence of the entrustorprincipal's negligence in entrusting the vehicle to the entrustee-agent 4
Therefore, according to the Illinois federal court, an employee's prior bad
acts are relevant to support a negligent entrustment claim submitted under a
comparative fault statute.
In most jurisdictions, however, comparative fault does not affect the
application of the majority rule." This policy suggests that "comparative
fault as it applies to the plaintiff should end with the parties to the
accident."56 Negligent entrustment may establish independent fault on the
employer but should not impose additional liability on the employer.5 The
employer's liability under negligent entrustment rests on the negligence of the
employee, so the employer's liability cannot exceed the liability of the

54. Lorio, 768 F. Supp. at 660-61.
55. Manyjurisdictions cited above as supporting the majority rule follow the rule
despite adhering to a theory of comparative fault. See Wise v. Fiberglass Sys., Inc.,
718 P.2d 1178, 1181 (Idaho 1986) (comparative fault adopted in 1971); Elrod v. G &
R Constr. Co., 628 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Ark. 1982) (comparative fault adopted in 1955);
Clooney v. Geeting, 352 So. 2d 1216, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (comparative
fault adopted in 1973); Whidby v. Colubine Carrier, Inc., 356 S.E.2d 709, 711 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1987) (comparative fault adopted in 1913); Nehi Bottling Co. v. Jefferson,
84 So. 2d 684, 686 (Miss. 1956) (comparative fault adopted in 1910); Ledesma v.
Cannonball, Inc., 538 N.E.2d 655, 661 (II1. App. Ct. 1989) supersededby statute as
stated in Lorio v. Cartwright, 768 F. Supp. 658 (N.D. III. 1991) (comparative fault
adopted in 1981); Estate of Arrington v. Fields, 578 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979) (comparative fault adopted in 1973); Bowman v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 832 F.
Supp. 1014, 1021-22 (D.S.C. 1993) (comparative fault adopted in 1991); and Ortiz v.
New Mexico State Police, 814 P.2d 117, 120 (N.M. Ct.App. 1991) (comparative fault
adopted in 1980).
56. Appellant's Substitute Reply Brief at 6, McHaffie v. Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822
(Mo. 1995). The Appellant's brief supports the policy argument that plaintiff's
comparative negligence should remain the same, regardless of whether the remaining
fault can be allocated in part to the employer through negligent entrustment. Id.
57. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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employee.5" For these reasons, the majority rule's rationale is applicable in
comparative fault jurisdictions.
Many courts recognize a more common exception to the majority rule
where punitive damages are plead along with negligent entrustment. 9 Courts
adhering to this exception rationalize that negligent entrustment claims should
be admitted where the claim imposes additional liability on the employer than
could be derived from the employee's misconduct. The Arkansas Supreme
Court in Elrod v. G. & R. Construction Co. distinguished between cases

submitting punitive damages from cases submitting just compensatory
damages.
Similarly, a Florida appellate court supported the punitive
damages exception because punitive damages plead with negligent entrustment
imposes additional liability on the employer outside of the damages caused by
the employee's negligence. 6 While interpreting Mississippi law, however,
a federal district court in Mississippi failed to recognize the exception. 62 The
federal court found that punitive damages could only be determined if the
employee would be liable for such damages.63
Until recently, the punitive exception did not exist in Missouri because
Missouri courts faithfully followed the minority view and allowed negligent
entrustment claims to be submitted with theories alleging respondeatsuperior
liability.' Previous Missouri decisions distinguished the negligence of an
employer from the negligence of an employee. 65 The Missouri Supreme
Court, however, was unconvinced by the state's longstanding view in this area
and argued for the majority rule in McHaffie.'
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant decision, the court decided that Missouri should adopt the
majority view and refused to allow a plaintiff to proceed against an employer
under negligent entrustment when an employer conceded to liability under

58. See supra notes 33-34, 48-49 and accompanying text.
59. See Elrod, 628 S.W.2d at 19; Clooney, 352 So. 2d at 1220; Plummer V.
Henry, 171 S.E.2d 330, 334 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969).
60. Elrod, 628 S.W.2d at 19.
61. Clooney, 352 So. 2d at 1220.

62. Hood v. Dealers Transp. Co., 459 F. Supp. 684, 685-86 (N.D. Miss. 1978).
63. Id.

64. Gaines v. Monsanto Co., 655 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
According to the Eastern District in Gaines, the tort of negligent entrustment is
independent of respondeatsuperiorliability. Id.
65. See Gaines, 655 S.W.2d at 570.
66. McHaffie v. Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Mo. 1995).
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respondeat superior.67 The court noted that the liability of an employer
under any vicarious liability doctrine is "fixed" by the liability of the
employee. 8 The court stated that if all theories of vicarious liability were
pled the "potentially inflammatory" and "irrelevant" evidence submitted to
support these claims would confuse the jury and prejudice the defendants. 9
The court refused to accept the persuasive case law from minority rule
jurisdictions. 0 The court referred to these minority opinions as contrary to
"the overwhelming weight of authority" and proclaimed, without explanation,
that it would be "illogical" to assess a greater percentage of fault to the
employer than is attributable to the employee. 7'
The McHaffie court, however, restricted its opinion to the facts of this
case 72 and held that an employer may be found liable on a theory that is not
derivative of the negligence of the employee.73 Furthermore, in an action by
an employer to recover contribution from an employee, the court found it
conceivable that the percentage of fault between the employer and employee
may be relevant.74 Finally, the court recognized the punitive damages
exception to the majority rule noting that "it is also possible that an employer
or an entrustee may be liable for punitive
damages which would not be
7
assessed against the employer/entrustee.
V. COMMENT
The McHaffie court's decision pulls Missouri into compliance with the
majority view on pleading both respondeatsuperiorand negligent entrustment,
but unnecessarily eliminates a claim used to compensate the victims of an
employer's negligence. The decision, in short, violates the general rule

67. Id
68. Id. The court found that the defendant employer is strictly liable for an
employee's misconduct under the doctrine of respondeatsuperior. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
at 827. Courts allying themselves with the minority view include: Bruck
v. Jim Walter Corp., 470 So. 2d 1141, 1142-45 (Ala. 1985); Perin v. Peuler, 130
N.W.2d 4, 8 (Mich. 1964); Clark v. Stewart, 185 N.E. 71, 72-73 (Ohio 1933).
71. McHaffie, 891 S.W.2d at 827.
72. Id.
at 826.
73. Id.An example would be where the employee was unknowingly supplied
with defective equipment by the employer in which case the employer's liability would
not be derivative of the employee's misconduct. Respondent's Substitute Reply Brief
at 6, McHaffie v. Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. 1995).
74. McHaffie, 891 S.W.2d at 826.
75. Id.(citing Clooney v. Geeting, 352 So. 2d 1216, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977)).
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allowing a plaintiff to pursue independent and consistent causes of actions
without having to elect between them.76
The court's decision fails to consider the independent and consistent
character of the separate theories.77 Negligent entrustment and respondeat
superior are both vicarious liability actions,7" which are dependent on the
misconduct of another.79 However, the torts are distinguishable and
independent of each other.8" Respondeat superior liability is based on the
employee's negligence while negligent entrustment liability rests on the
employer's own negligence.8 The independence of these separate torts,
however, does not make the claims inconsistent. As long as the respondeat
superior claim does not allege what the negligent entrustment claim denies,
or vice versa, the theories are consistent and may be pled together.8 2
Because negligent entrustment and respondeatsuperiorclaims are independent
and consistent, future plaintiffs should be entitled to pursue both claims.
Despite the independence and consistency of the separate theories, the
McHaffie court found that the collateral evidence supporting negligent
entrustment claims is typically "inflammatory" and prejudicial to the defendant
employer who has already conceded to liability for the employee's
misconduct.
The court, however, refused to consider other procedural
safeguards commonly used to exclude "inflammatory" evidence.84 For

76. See Insurance Co. of North America v. Skyway Aviation, Inc., 828 S.W.2d
888, 893 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
77. See supra notes 34 and 42 and accompanying text.
78. Ransom v. Adams Dairy Co., 684 S.W.2d 915, 920 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). See
supra note 23 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 33 and 41 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 34 and 42 and accompanying text. The Alabama Supreme
Court found the employer's negligence the basis of a claim under negligent
entrustment, stating that the claim was "separate and distinct" from an action under
respondeatsuperior. Bruck v. Jim Walter Corp. 470 So. 2d 1141, 1143 (Ala. 1985)
(quoting Rush v. McDonald, 106 So. 175, 178 (Ala. 1925)).
81. An employer's vicarious liability based on respondeat superiorrests on an
employee's misconduct committed within the scope of employment. See supra notes
27-29 and accompanying text. An employer's liability under negligent entrustment
rests on the employer's own negligence in entrusting the employee with responsibility.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
82. Orrock v. Crouse Realtors, Inc., 823 S.W.2d 40, 41 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
83. McHaffie, 891 S.W.2d at 826.
84. Defendant employers can file motions for summary judgment to preclude
insufficient negligent entrustment claims and the accompanying evidence from the trial
proceedings. Mo. R. CIV. P. 74.04.
Furthermore, Missouri recently passed a rule of civil procedure similar to federal
Rule 11 which would allow defendant employers to preclude frivolous negligent
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss1/11
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instance, summary judgment proceedings, the frivolous claims rule and the
Federal Rules of Evidence may be used to preclude insufficient or frivolous
negligent entrustment claims and the accompanying prejudicial evidence."
Even if the court's findings could be justified, however, the punitive
damage exception limits the effectiveness of the McHaffie decision. The
court's holding reserves a "possible" exception to the majority rule, excluding
negligent entrustment claims when punitive damages are pled.86 The courts
which adhere to this common exception rationalize that negligent entrustment
claims should be admitted where the claim imposes additional liability on the
employer than could be derived from the employee's misconduct." The
inflammatory and prejudicial evidence that accompanies the submission of
negligent entrustment would, therefore, be admissible with the simplicity of
pleading punitive damages.88
Punitive damages generally require a showing of willful and wanton
misconduct.8 9 However, in Porter v. Erickson Trans. Corp.,'"the Southern

District Court of Appeals held that "the lack of proper training or
qualifications on the part of an employee to perform an assigned task is
evidence which tends to support submission of punitive damages."'" Under

entrustment claims and the accompanying evidence. Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.03. The
Missouri rule is almost identical to the federal rule and imposes sanctions against
parties who plead frivolous claims in order to bring in additional evidence. Mo. R.
Civ. P. 55.03; see also William E. Corum, Note, Sanctions Under Missouri Rule
55.03: Problems and Promises,61 UMKC L. REV. 381 (1992).
Finally, federal courts may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. FED. R. EvID. 403. A negligent
entrustment claim, therefore, may be excluded ifthe probative value ofthe entrustment
evidence is substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect on the defendant
employer. FED R. EVID. 403.
85. See supra note 84.
86. McHaffie, 891 S.W.2d at 826.

87. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
88. Respondents' Substitute Brief at 19, McHaffie v. Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822

(Mo. 1995); Hood v. Dealers Transp. Co., 459 F. Supp. 684, 686 (N.D. Miss. 1978)
(interpreting Mississippi law).
89. Propst v. Brown, 854 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). Specifically,
the court found that punitive damages are justifiably awardable for outrageous conduct
or for a party's evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of others. Id.
90. 851 S.W.2d 725 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
91. Porter,851 S.W.2d at 745 (citing Menaugh v. Resler Optometry, Inc., 799
S.W.2d 71 (Mo. 1990)). The appellate court in Porterfound the failure of a grade "B"
mechanic to have his work reviewed by a grade "A" mechanic could constitute
"complete indifference to, or conscious disregard for, the safety of others." Id. at 745.
Furthermore, the court held that the "failure to properly train an employee to perform
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the Porter punitive damages standard, almost any evidence of negligent
entrustment or negligent hiring could support a request for punitive
damages.92 The trial court may never find punitives, but under the broad
Porterstandard and the McHaffie punitive damages exception, the prejudicial
evidence which accompanies negligent entrustment claims will be admissible
and the purpose and intent of the McHaffie decision will be averted.
Therefore, while the Supreme Court's holding moves Missouri into the
majority view on submitting theories of respondeatsuperior and negligent
entrustment, the practical application of this decision may effectively
undermine the court's holding.
VI. CONCLUSION
The McHaffie decision attempted to address the evidentiary conflict which
arises when a negligent entrustment claim continues after a defendant
employer admits vicarious liability under respondeat superior. The court
failed to recognize the independent consistent nature of a negligent
entrustment claim as it relates to a claim resting on respondeat superior.
Other methods to preclude the prejudicial evidence were not considered, and
the punitive damage exception left the decision virtually ineffective. With
these failings in mind, the court may want to take another look at the decision
and reevaluate its findings. Upon review, the court should recognize the
problems with the majority view and pull Missouri back under the minority
rule.
BRENT POWELL

a task that, if improperly performed, threatens death or serious harm can suffice as a
basis to award punitive damages." Id. at 747 (citing Blum v. Airport Terminal Servs.,
Inc., 762 S.W.2d 67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)).
92. See supra notes 32 and 37 and accompanying text.
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